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What, Then, is Consciousness? 
 
By Fasiku Gbenga, 
 
Introduction 
Consciousness is one of the ubiquitous phenomena which when subjected to any kind of 
systematic study and analysis becomes elusive to comprehend, describe and explain. It is in this 
respect that the kind of puzzlement and difficulty encountered in understanding and defining 
consciousness is compared with that which is encountered in understanding and defining time. It 
is said, for example that ―in thinking about consciousness, the puzzlement one finds oneself in is 
rather like St. Augustine‘s riddle in his contemplations about the nature of time: When no one 
asked him, he knew what it is; being asked, however, he no longer did.‖
1
 As David Chalmers 
notes, ―consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it 
is, what it does, or why it evolved.‖
2
 One may, however, wonder why consciousness, something 
so familiar and commonly close to us, brews problems. Contemporary literature is replete with 
rigorous attempts inquire what makes consciousness, and what sort of problems it creates. 
However, these efforts have not yielded the desired result because the object of inquiry is itself 
opaque. ‗What is ‗consciousness‘?‘ is a question whose answer is not obvious. Hence, attempts 
to resolve it result in searching for an unknown object by groping in the dark. The focus of this 
paper is to elucidate the problem of identifying the object of enquiry in consciousness studies. It 
identifies and critically discusses the different conceptions of consciousness and draws out the 
sense in which defining consciousness is really a problem of consciousness.  
The general problems of consciousness 
 What could be regarded as the general problems of consciousness are multifaceted. I 
would like to categorize some of these problems into two. The first, concerns the epistemological 
issues on the concept of consciousness. Parts of the problems are to answer the questions: What 
are the various conceptions of consciousness? How does one distinguish among these 
conceptions? How does one know that she is conscious? How does one relate this knowledge to 
others? The second category, concerns the ontological issues about the phenomenon referred to 
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to? What are the differences among these kinds of phenomena? There is the further problem 
which is that given some properties of consciousness, consciousness is supposedly a distinct kind 
of phenomenon, different from matter. Given this supposition, the question is, ‗how are we to 
understand the causal relationships between consciousness and matter and, in particular, the 
causal relationship between consciousness and the brain?‘ What are the properties of 
consciousness? Do these properties exist? Why does their existence create problems?  
 
Max Velmans identified three fundamental issues that are often regarded as parts of the problems 
of consciousness. These are: ‗what is the function of consciousness? How, for example, does it 
relate to human information processing?‘; ‗what forms of matter are associated with 
consciousness – in particular, what are the neural substrates of consciousness in the human 
brain?‘ and; ‗what are the appropriate ways to examine consciousness, to discover its nature? 
Which features can we examine with first-person methods, which features require third-person 
methods, and how do first-and third-person findings relate to each other?‘
 3 
The issues raised in 
by Velmans can be grouped into two categories. The first category of issues are about what 
consciousness does; the functions of consciousness. The second category bothers on the ontology 
of consciousness; the nature of the phenomenon called ‗consciousness‘. These issues are 
embedded in the questions earlier highlighted as the problems of consciousness, and which 
David Chalmers
4
 summed up as the ‗easy‘ and ‗hard‘ problems of consciousness. However, 
while these issues about the nature of consciousness and what consciousness does are worthy of 
consideration on their own, it is important that we are clear about what ‗consciousness‘ is. This 
quest to answer the question – ‗What is ‗consciousness‘?‘ is at the base of the problems of 
consciousness. Let us elucidate what this problem entails. 
 
What is ‘consciousness’? 
  ‗Consciousness‘, like many other terms, ―does not admit of a definition in terms of genus 
and differentia or necessary and sufficient conditions.‖
5
 The question ‗what is ‗consciousness‘?‘ 
is at the base of what are identified as the problems of consciousness in philosophy. There is no 
generally agreed definition or a set of definitions of ‗consciousness‘ in philosophy and within the 
diverse fields concerned with consciousness. This is because it is not possible to state the 
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and ‗Y‘ is the definiens (differentia, a property). As Max Velmans and others have pointed out, 
the definition of consciousness is hard to come by, partly due to the fact that consciousness is a 
global term, but it is contextually defined.
6
 This is odd because given that we have 
―psychological data‖ about what it is like to be conscious or to have consciousness to serve as 
the basis for an agreed definition,‖
7
 one expects that definitions of ‗consciousness‘, which 
include, at least, all examples of the psychological data – properties, features and characteristics 
– associated with consciousness, would suffice as the definitions of the term. However, until 




 Moreover, there is no agreed meaning of ‗consciousness‘. The concept, ‗consciousness‘, 
R.J Gennaro observes, is notoriously ambiguous
9
 because there are diverse meanings attributed 
to it. As a result, ‗the term means many different things to many different people, and no 
universally agreed ―core meaning exists;‘ and, ‗it is not even clear whether everyone means the 
same thing by the term consciousness, even within the bounds of a single discipline‘
10
. For 
instance, Ram Vimal lists and discusses forty diverse meanings attributed to the term
11
; while 
some of these meanings are only subtly different from one another, others are mutually 
incompatible. The forty meanings are grouped into two based on what each of them attributes to 
consciousness.
12
 One group consists of meanings of consciousness that attributed various 
functions to consciousness. In this case, consciousness is not an entity or a property in the world, 
but some functions of entities or phenomena that already exist, and to explain it does not involve 
an expansion of a physical ontology. Consciousness is, thus, defined as a process that emerges 
from interactions of the brain, the body and the environment; as a result, a report or an outcome 
of some complex neuro-biological processes.
13
 Consciousness is the ability to discriminate 
stimuli, to report information, to monitor internal states or to control behaviour
14
. The second 
group consists of definitions of consciousness as an irreducible fundamental mental entity or 
phenomenon. Consciousness as an entity or a phenomenon, to explain it, requires an expansion 
or a re-conception of a physical ontology in order to accommodate the new entrant. Hence, 





; as ‗self (subjective or first person experience of subject) or self-
awareness denoted by ‗I‘
17
 and; as ‗awareness of awareness‘
18
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ontological and epistemological issues that ensue in the distinctions among the various meanings 
attributed to ‗consciousness‘, we shall return to these shortly. 
 It is important to point out that none of the definitions and or meanings is offered as the 
definition of ‗consciousness‘, rather, the meanings are said to be attributed to the term. To 
attribute a meaning to a term is to ascribe the meaning to the term, and this is based on 
assumptions and contexts of the person making the attribution or ascription. This implies that 
none of the meanings or definitions attributed to ‗consciousness‘ is the meaning or definition of 
‗consciousness‘. This suggests that the quest for the definition of the term, different from what is 
attributed to the term, is yet to be addressed. As earlier asserted, the consensus view is that 
everyone knows what it is, but there is no agreement on its definition, and this undefinability of 
‗consciousness‘ is taken as one of the problems of consciousness.  
 However, I think the quest for the definition of ‗consciousness‘ is based on an erroneous 
view that there must be a generally acceptable definition of ‗consciousness‘. I do not think that 
the undefinability of the term ‗consciousness‘ should create an insurmountable problem of 
consciousness. I accept that one sense of offering a definition of a term is to give its meaning
19
. 
This may suggest that there is the core meaning of a term which definitions attempt to uncover. 
But, given the diversity in the definitions of the term ‗consciousness‘, and the fact that there is no 
agreement about its core meaning, the following are the possible inferences to arrive at: first, that 
there is no core meaning to seek for; ‗the term ‗consciousness‘ means different things to different 
people‘; what passes as a definition of ‗consciousness‘ is dependent on who, when, where and 
how it is defined. One possible implication of this is that when giving meaning or definition of 
‗consciousness‘, we are open to what Robinson calls the ―danger of circumscribing nature within 
the bounds of our own nature‖
20
, which ultimately confines or cloaks possible discourses of 
consciousness to the narrow sphere of the definer. This is the point being made in 
―Consciousness Across Cultures‖
21
, that different kinds of questions arise when ‗consciousness‘ 
is defined across cultures. The second inference is that there is the objective meaning of 
‗consciousness‘. In other words, the claim that there is no definition of ‗consciousness‘ is just the 
fact that we are yet to arrive at a definition that can give an adequate representation of this 
objective core meaning or, what Vimal calls, optimal definition
22
. The former is not 
philosophically enterprising because of its implied contextual relativism, which may not help in 
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objective or the core meaning of ‗consciousness‘, existing out there as parts of the furniture of 
the universe or as some sort of entities in the Platonic world of forms. This assumption needs to 
be proven.  
An attempt towards providing this proof was offered by Vimal in his attempt at providing 
a general definition of consciousness which includes most views and the context in which the 
term ‗consciousness‘ is used results in defining ‗consciousness‘ as ―a mental aspect of an entity 
(system or process), which is a conscious experience, a conscious function, or both, depending 
on the context.‖
23
 Vimal argues that this definition accommodates most views on consciousness, 
because any investigator‘s finding related to consciousness has to be conscious function, 
conscious experience or both depending on the context of investigation.  For example, ―if the 
dominating view is materialist or functionalist, then consciousness is likely to be considered as 
conscious function. If the dominating view is dualist or idealist, consciousness is more likely to 
be considered in terms of conscious experience. If the dominating view is dual-aspect, 
panpsychist, panprotopsychist, panexperimentalist or panprotoexperimentalist, consciousness is 
likely to be considered as both conscious experience and conscious function.‖
24
 The problem 
with Vimal‘s general definition is that what we seek is the definition of ‗consciousness‘, what he 
presents us with is how the word is used in different contexts. Note that in a particular context, a 
word could be used to mean or refer to, what is, within that context, taken to be its meaning or 
referent. This does not imply that the contextual meaning is the core meaning or general 
definition of the word. Also, if Vimal‘s definition is further explicated, it would show that it is 
less general than it claims. For instance, if each context expatiate its conviction of what 
‗consciousness‘ should refer to or how the word is to be used, each context would take 
consciousness to be distinct kinds; then ‗upon what common ground is the general definition 
general?‘ What general phenomenon is defined, and in what general way has it been defined? So, 
Vimal‘s supposed general definition of ‗consciousness‘ fails as core definition of 
‗consciousness‘, it is just a collated different senses of ‗consciousness‘ that are derived from the 
different contexts, and this does not amount to a core definition.  
One may, however, wonder whether there is indeed a core meaning of consciousness. 
One way of justifying the ontology of the core meaning of ‗consciousness‘ is to argue that the 
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unable to express. This, however, begs the question; it is the ontology of the core meaning that 
needs to be ascertained. Another possible argument to justify that there is a core meaning of 
consciousness is that the core meaning of ‗consciousness‘ is a phenomenon that is beyond human 
comprehension. As a result, definitions of ‗consciousness‘ offered by human beings cannot 
represent it. This argument merely qualifies the ‗core meaning‘, it does not answer the 
ontological question about what is the core meaning of ‗consciousness‘ and, whether there is 
such a phenomenon as parts of the objective fabrics of the world. Without explaining this 
ontology, the claim that the core meaning is beyond human comprehension still begs the 
question.  
The claim that there is the core meaning of ‗consciousness‘ could be supported with the 
argument that challenged the assertion that ‗consciousness‘ is ambiguous. As Michael Antony 
argues, there is a general sense of ‗consciousness‘ that enjoys widespread use.
25
 This is premised 
on the fact that titles of journals, books, articles, etc, containing the word ‗consciousness‘ in 
diverse fields suggests that there is a general sense of ‗consciousness‘ that applies to all or most 
of the titles covered by the term. Moreover, in the diverse titles containing ‗consciousness‘, even 
if there are different senses of the word, it is not the case that the word simultaneously expresses 
its varieties of senses or definitions. Thus, Antony agrees with the view that an ambiguous 
expression ‗resists as it were, the simultaneous activation of more than one of its senses.‘ He 
further asserts that ―occurrences of ‗consciousness‘ within such works typically have the same 
meaning as in the works‘ titles. The general sense of ‗consciousness‘ thus begins to appear 
pervasive indeed.‖
26
 Antony, therefore, concludes that ‗consciousness‘ is not in any sense 
ambiguous. It is, however, non sequitor that because titles in diverse fields containing 
‗consciousness‘ have a general sense of consciousness, then there is a general sense of 
consciousness involved in the different occurrences of ‗consciousness‘. In fact, it is just because 
the several occurrences of ‗consciousness‘ in diverse titles across different fields has diverse 
senses or meanings that make the quest for the universally acceptable definition of 
‗consciousness‘ really a problem. Moreover, the different distinctions made even within a 
particular field also points to the fact that several appearances of ‗consciousness‘ within a field 
have different senses or meanings. What are distinguished as different kinds of consciousness, 
are not the meanings or definitions of ‗consciousness‘, but various forms of consciousness. For 
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consciousness, state consciousness, access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, 
transitive consciousness, minimal consciousness, perceptual consciousness, etc, that are 
distinguished, and it does not follow that because each of the distinct kind of consciousness bear 
the word ‗consciousness‘ that all the occurrences of the word in the distinctions mean the same 
thing. 
From the above, two possible positions are derivable. The first position is that 
‗consciousness‘ has no definition; it could be defined according to the context of its use. Every 
use of the word ‗consciousness‘ would be correct. But this raises the question about the 
ontological status of what is being defined: does consciousness exist as an objective phenomenon 
or consciousness is a subjective phenomenon? Two responses have been offered. On the one 
hand, the view that consciousness is an objective phenomenon supports the position that there is 
the core meaning or the real definition of ‗consciousness‘. This is the position prominently 
defended by most physicalists who argue that consciousness is just one kind of thing accessed, 
assessed and described differently. It is also inconformity with the view that consciousness is a 
spectrum, with different levels, and at each level, different senses or uses of the term 
‗consciousness‘ are formed. So, as K. Wilber notes, 
each investigator would be correct when speaking about his 
or her own level and thus all other investigators – plugged in 
at different levels – would appear to be completely wrong. 
The controversy would not be cleared up by having all 
investigators agree with each other, but rather by realizing 
that all were talking about one spectrum seen from different 
levels… And of course, they would both be right, because 
each was working with a different band of the spectrum, and 
when they realized that, the argument would cease, and the 
phenomenon…would be understood through a synthesis of 




On the other hand, the view that consciousness is not an objective phenomenon is reflected in the 
dualist definition of ‗consciousness‘ as a distinct property; and that consciousness is known 
differently from the way other property in the world is known. These two responses summarized 
the two positions in Philosophy of Mind in response to, first, the ontological question: ‗does 
consciousness exist as a distinct substance or properties of the world or consciousness is nothing 
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questions: ‗are the properties of consciousness knowable?‘ ‗By which method or means are the 
properties of consciousness studied or known?‘ In acknowledging this problem, Max Velmans 
posits that  
it should come as no surprise that such diverse assumptions 
about the nature of consciousness and how we can study it 
have created divisions between research communities that 
can be difficult to cross. There can, for example, be no 
point of convergence and certainly no consensus between 
researchers who take the existence of conscious 
phenomenology to be both self-evident and ontologically 
primary, with those who give no credence to that 
phenomenology at all. Given this diversity, some 
consciousness researchers have doubted that a systematic 
study of ―consciousness‖ as such, is even possible.
28
    
 
The quest to determine which of these two positions is correct is also a problem of 
consciousness.  
The second position is that the quest for the core meaning or real definition of 
‗consciousness‘ as the response to ‗what is ‗consciousness?‘ may be unwarranted. This is 
because, on the one hand, it is difficult to justify the assumption that there is the core meaning or 
real definition of ‗consciousness‘ to be sought for. This explains the reason that the quest for 
definition or meaning of ‗consciousness‘ continues despite sustained and burgeoning efforts to 
arrive at one. Also, many of the definitions and meanings of ‗consciousness‘ are derived from 
the several theories developed in response to various problems of consciousness. Since these 
theories are quite different, it is expected that there would be varieties of definitions and 
meanings attributed to ‗consciousness‘.
29
 Therefore, the elusiveness of the core meaning or real 
definition is either because there is no such thing as consciousness or it exists but there can be no 
agreement on what it is. On the other hand, it could be argued that the undefinability of 
‗consciousness‘ does not create any barrier for the continued and sustained research or 
discourses on consciousness. This is premised on the view that ―definitions need not be final for 
research to begin; It is enough that definitions be sufficiently similar for different investigators to 
be able to agree that they are investigating the same thing‖
30
. If this argument can be sustained, 
then it could be argued that agreement or otherwise on the real definition or core meaning of 
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designate. Are investigators of consciousness convinced that they are investigating the same 
thing? I share Sloman‘s doubt on this. He argues that ―people who discuss consciousness delude 
themselves in thinking that they know what they are talking about...it is not just one thing but 
many things muddled together—rather like our multifarious uses of ‗energy‘(intellectual energy, 
music with energy, high energy explosion, etc.).‖
31
 Anders Sogaard and Stine Osterskov Sogaard 
reiterated the point differently. To them, consciousness studies include a variety of different 
topics that may not be easy to reconcile, so, seeking a definitive definition that will encompass 
all the topics may be difficult to earn. Also, the Sogaards argue that the claim that there is no 
definition of consciousness is based on the erroneous assumption that there is only one kind of 
consciousness, which ‗consciousness‘ designates. This assumption is erroneous because ‗people 
use the word ‗consciousness‘ to refer to different concept all the time‘; hence, ‗there is no reason 
to agree on just one definition‘ of ‗consciousness‘
32
. The nature of consciousness being 
investigated is quite varied along distinct perspectives, orientations, theories, positions, schools 
of thoughts, disciplines, etc.  
What derives from the two positions is that what is necessary in addressing the question: 
‗what is ‗consciousness‘?‘ is that there is an agreement on the object of discourse. In this respect, 
the question ‗what is ‗consciousness‘?‘ would not be understood as asking for a strict or a 
definitive definition of ‗consciousness‘, but for an account of the phenomena that the term is 
used to designate. It is on this basis that research and inquiries about consciousness can go on 
from diverse levels, contexts and perspectives without further problem. It may then be argued 
that the ambiguity of ‗consciousness‘ is not about its meaning or the sense attributed to it, 
because there is no agreed phenomenon which the term designates given the level, context or 
perspective it is being used, but about its referent. This, however, would not be a problem 
peculiar to the word ‗consciousness‘. Referential ambiguity is a problem clearly articulated by 
Gottlob Frege.  
Frege, in ―On Sense and Reference‖,
33
 asserts that a sign, (a word) has both sense and 
reference. The sense of a word contains the mode of presentation of that which is designated by 
the word. A referent is that which is designated.
34
 For Frege, a word has a sense which is a 
conceptual content of the word. There is a definite reference or object that corresponds to the 
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also be picked out by several other words. Corresponding to each of these words are distinct 
senses. Since a thousand different words that have distinct senses can refer to a particular object, 
it means that there is no direct relation between words and the referents they pick out in the 
world. This implies that the relation between words and their referents is mediated by the senses 
of the words. Hence, for Frege, sense provides some kind of connecting link between a word and 
its referent. In fact, it must be noted that for Frege, there are situations in which a word has a 
sense and there is no corresponding referent.
35
 This shows that for Frege, first, the relation 
between a word or a name and its referent is not a necessary relation. Second, words are not 
essential properties of an object. Again, since several words with distinct senses can refer to a 
particular object or to no object at all, then it means that no object has its word rigidly fixed nor 
is the reference of a word rigidly fixed. What derives from this is that ‗consciousness‘ needs not 
have a definitive sense and referent, and the fact that there is no such sense is demonstrated by 
the distinct in exhaustive meanings (senses) attributed to the word; also, the fact that there is no 
rigid referent of ‗consciousness‘ is demonstrated by different kinds of phenomena the word is 
used to referred to.
36
 There is the possibility of conflating the meaning of ‗consciousness‘ with 
the phenomena it is used to refer to. This error is evident when Antony mistakenly points at 







and others, use the term to designate as what the writers use the word to mean.
40
 As seen in 
Frege, the sense (meaning) of a word is one thing, the reference (the object of reference) of the 
word is another.  
Conclusion 
What would contribute to a clear definition of the problem of consciousness in 
philosophy is not to interpret the question ‗what is ‗consciousness‘?‘ as a quest to engage in 
semantics of ‗consciousness‘ but to identify the phenomena that the word is used to designate. In 
other words, I join Antony in dissenting Quine‘s call for semantic ascent
41
, i.e., focusing on 
expressions used to refer to philosophically perplexing phenomena instead of the phenomena 
themselves. Although, as an objection to this conclusion, the classical position defended by 
James William could be raised. The position is that ‗consciousness‘ is the name of a nonentity, 
refers to or stands for nothing concrete, but a function and should be discarded. William‘s 
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first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind 
by the disappearing ‗soul‘ upon the air of philosophy.‖
 42
 
However, against this position is the common assumption in the consciousness study that 
the term ‗consciousness‘ has a referent, either concrete or function; but the problem is that there 
is no agreed or one and only referent of the term. It is on the ground of this disagreement that the 
divergent positions raise on the ontological and epistemological questions about ‗consciousness‘, 
such as ‗What is consciousness?‘ ‗Does consciousness exist?‘ ‗What are the essential properties 
of consciousness?‘ ‗Is consciousness knowable and by what means?‘ become philosophically 
interesting.   
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2
 Chalmers David, The Conscious Mind: In search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 3 
3
 Max Velmans, ―How to Separate Conceptual Issues from Empirical One in the Study of 
Consciousness.‖ Progress in Brain Research, (Armsterdam: Elsevier, Vol. 168, 2008), pp.1-2 
4
 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Chalmers 
popularized the distinction between the easy and hard problems of consciousness.  
5
 John Searle. ―The Problem of Consciousness‖. In Antti Revonsuo and Matti Kamppinen (eds.) 
Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience, (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Inc. 1994), p.93. More important, the problem of defining ‗consciousness‘ has been, 
and is still, a subject of philosophic controversy. See, for example, Hartley Buur Alexander, 
―The Concept of Consciousness‖, The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
Methods, Vol. 1, No. 5 (March 3, 1904), pp. 119-124; B.H Bode, ―Realistic Conceptions of 
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